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Economic Inequality and the Provision 
of Schooling
Thomas A. Downes and David N. Figlio 
The school finance landscape has changed dramatically in
the past thirty years. Most states have undertaken major
changes to their school finance programs, motivated prin-
cipally by the notion that the unequal school resources
associated with unequal incomes and community sorting
lead to unequal educational and labor market outcomes.
This paper describes the empirical evidence on the
relationship between school finance reforms and student
outcomes and presents new evidence on the effects of these
policies on community and school composition.
BACKGROUND
During the past several decades, federal and state govern-
ments have pursued redistributive policies aimed at foster-
ing “equality of economic opportunity”—the idea that
although people’s incomes may vary, this variance should
be due primarily to factors such as individual ability
and effort, not to differences in circumstance. This goal
has motivated social welfare policies at both the state
and federal levels. Despite decades of redistributive
policies, numerous empirical studies (such as Solon [1992],
Zimmerman [1992], Corcoran et al. [1992], and Shea
[1997]) continue to find evidence of a substantial level of
income persistence across generations, even after holding
constant many individual characteristics. Shea’s findings
are particularly compelling, as he contends that only
parental income correlated with parental ability (rather
than “luck”) affects children’s future incomes. This finding
suggests that cash transfers to parents may have little effect
in influencing their children’s labor market outcomes.
What might account for this link between parental
income and children’s income? Many economists believe
that this relationship is due in large part to differential
human-capital investment between high-income and
low-income families. High-income parents can invest in
more (and better) education for their children, in a manner
that low-income parents cannot, due to credit market
imperfections. Since credit markets are imperfect, because
parents cannot borrow against their children’s future
earnings to finance human-capital investment, low-income
parents may face binding liquidity constraints and, conse-
quently, may underinvest in their children’s human capital
(Loury 1981; Becker and Tomes 1986; Mulligan 1995).
This is only one possible explanation, however, and may
carry less weight given Shea’s finding that parental money
per se does not matter in determining their children’s
outcomes.
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The persistence of income inequality, together
with the existence of market imperfections that may help
perpetuate this inequality, has motivated policymakers to
explore various options designed to make opportunities
more equal. Many in the policy arena have suggested that
opportunities could be further equalized via the implemen-
tation of changes in the system of school finance that make
education spending more equal. This argument is bolstered
by substantial evidence that premarket factors play a
significant role in determining subsequent labor market
outcomes (see, for example, Neal and Johnson [1996] and
Bishop [1989]). Hence, school finance reforms could serve,
to some degree, to sever the link between parental income
and the human capital accumulation that leads to
improved outcomes of their children.
Thus, the goal of fostering increased income
mobility through equality of economic opportunity is a
major motivation of the dozens of recent school finance
reforms, either court-ordered or enacted by legislative edict.
These policies have experienced a resurgence in the last
several years, with state supreme court decisions mandating
equalization in states such as Kentucky, Texas, Vermont,
and New Hampshire, further altering a school finance
landscape that has changed dramatically since 1970.
The best available evidence on the impact of these
major finance reforms, and of other lesser changes in the
systems of school finance in the individual states, supports
the conclusion that these reforms have reduced within-
state inequality in education spending (Murray, Evans, and
Schwab 1998) by weakening the link between school
district property wealth and spending. This weakening of
the link between property wealth and spending does not
imply that there has been a commensurate weakening of
the link between education spending and current income.
Since low-income individuals reside in both low- and
high-property-wealth districts, as do high-income individ-
uals, the impact of finance reforms on the relationship
between spending and current income must be examined
independently. Support for this argument is provided by
Brunner and Sonstelie (1999), who show that finance
reforms in California have not changed the distribution of
spending across income groups.
To examine the impact of school finance changes
in the 1970s and 1980s on the relationship between educa-
tion spending and income, we combined data drawn from
school-district-level extracts from the 1970 and 1990
Censuses of Population and Housing with financial data
drawn from the 1972 Census of Governments and the
1989-90 Survey of School District Finances. For each
district in each cross-section, we were able to observe per-
capita income, the fraction of the population in poverty,
total expenditures per pupil, current expenditures per pupil,
total expenditure per pupil relative to the state average,
and the fraction of revenues generated locally. We also had
complete data for a substantial number of these districts in
both 1970 and 1990, although—given the nature of the
1970 school-district-level extract—data on small, rural
districts were far less likely to be available than for their
urban and suburban counterparts.
When we examined the relationship between
income and spending, using all of the districts in each of the
cross-sections, we observed a slight decline in the strength
of the relationship between per-capita income and each of
the spending measures.1 For these same cross-sections, the
strength of the relationship between the poverty rate and
each spending measure exhibited a more substantial
decline, sometimes even changing direction.2 It appears,
however, that these changes were driven primarily by the
impact of the finance changes on rural districts. When we
limited our analysis to districts for which we had complete
data in both 1970 and 1990, the relationship between
per-capita income and the spending measures actually
strengthened between 1970 and 1990.3 For these districts,
the strength of the relationship between the poverty rate
and the spending measures did decline, but the decline was
not as substantial as that observed when the analysis was
based on the two cross-sections.4 Although these results
may seem surprising, they should not be completely unex-
pected, since the correlation between property wealth and
income is strongest in rural areas.
The implication of these results is that, while
finance reforms have shifted additional resources to income-
poor rural districts, the reforms have not shifted resources
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same extent. Thus, we find for the nation, as Brunner and
Sonstelie found for California, that the school finance
changes of the 1970s and 1980s may have done little to
redistribute spending across income groups.
In light of these results, the question of whether
finance reform policies will, in fact, weaken intergenera-
tional persistence in income remains an open one. Equally
uncertain are the impacts of these reforms on school and
community composition. This uncertainty concerning the
impact of school finance reforms has motivated a number of
economic theorists to explore the potential results of these
policies by crafting models that extend the classic Tiebout
(1956) model to develop predictions concerning the impact
of school finance reforms on various aspects of schooling
provision. A number of papers—including Bénabou (1993,
1996), Fernández and Rogerson (1996, 1997, 1998),
Nechyba (1996, 1999), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), and
Bearse, Glomm, and Ravikumar (1996)—address the
likely impact of these reforms on community composition,
public sector outcomes, and private school enrollments.
The papers in this line of research that consider
the impact of finance reforms on social mobility often
derive contradictory implications for the likely effects of
these reforms. On the one hand, Glomm and Ravikumar
(1992), along with many others, suggest that public provi-
sion of education increases social mobility. On the other
hand, Bénabou (1996) and Durlauf (1996) each show that
public provision of education can lead to decreased social
mobility in the event of income-stratified communities
and local financing of public schools (both of which argu-
ably are characteristic of schools in much of the United
States). The fact that plausible theoretical models yield
substantially divergent predictions makes this inherently
an empirical question.5
A review of the theoretical literature also makes it
clear that the impact of finance reforms on school and com-
munity composition can only be ascertained empirically.
The papers in this literature generally confirm the insight
of Fischel (1989); restrictions on the ability of individuals
to consume their desired level of education services in the
public sector will tend to break down the tendency of indi-
viduals to sort on the basis of income or parental education.
Furthermore, as Nechyba’s (1999) insight in a related con-
text makes clear, many of the high-income individuals
who move from previously high-spending to previously
low-spending school districts will, at the same time, be
choosing to opt out of the public schools.
This tendency of school finance reforms to induce
significant changes in community composition, however,
depends on the extent to which the ability of schools to
produce outcomes owes to the quality of peers in the
schools. Nechyba (1999) observes that if the peer effect is
sufficiently strong, individuals will either opt out of the
public sector or, by extension, will choose the public sector
only if they are able to reside in homogeneous communi-
ties. Pursuing the logical implication of this reasoning,
we expect that if parents feel that peers are sufficiently
important, school finance reforms and tax limits could
accentuate the tendency of individuals to sort both across
communities and across schools.6 This logic appears to
be confirmed by other theoretical work. For example,
while his focus is on the general equilibrium effects of
the introduction of private school vouchers, Nechyba
(1996) shows that comparison of alternative systems of
school finance depends not only on the structure of each of
these finance systems but also on the parents’ perceptions
of the link between spending and student performance and
of the importance of peer group effects. Bénabou (1996)
shows that the effects on student performance of a move
from a system of locally financed schools to a system of
state-financed schools depends critically on the importance
of both peer effects and purchased inputs in production and
on the extent of cross-community migration that the move
to a state-financed school induces.
In large part because of the relative newness of the
school finance reforms of the last two decades, there is no
empirical evidence on the relationship between these
policy changes and income inequality. As an intermediate
step, several authors (Husted and Kenny 1996; Hoxby
1998; Downes and Figlio 1998; Card and Payne 1998)
have empirically attacked the question of how school
finance reforms have affected the level and distribution of
student performance. Such an approach seems natural in
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standardized tests and future earnings (Loury and Garman
1995). Downes and Figlio (1998) and Card and Payne
(1998) are particularly noteworthy because they show that
student-level data can be used to evaluate the long-run
impact of policy changes on standardized test performance.
The differences in the conclusions reached by these two pairs
of authors also make it clear that reaching consensus on the
precise impact of finance reforms requires further work.7
Once consensus is reached on the impact of finance
reforms on student performance, is that the end of the
story? In our view, the answer is no for several reasons.
First, other effects of these policies may be interesting to
examine in their own right. Second, studying these
impacts in other areas allows us to begin to pinpoint the
determinants of the observed performance changes. Third,
by broadening the scope of our study of the effects of school
finance reforms, we can begin to complete our understand-
ing of the impact of these policy changes on the schooling
experience for all children, not just for those children
who remain in the public schools. This third point is
particularly important, because careful understanding of
the distributional consequences of a public policy change
requires that the entire distribution of students be studied.
To date, there have been few attempts to quantify
the magnitude and the nature of the interdistrict and
intersector mobility predicted in the theoretical work of
Nechyba (1996, 1999), Bénabou (1996), and Fernández
and Rogerson (1996, 1997, 1998). In this paper, we sum-
marize some of our own recent work on school finance
reforms and community and school composition, and inter-
pret the school performance results in the context of these
findings. In addition, we present new evidence on the effects
of school finance reforms on the differential selection into
public and private schools of central-city students from
high-income and highly educated families. 
SCHOOL FINANCE REFORMS AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF STUDENT OUTCOMES
Although a vast literature exists on the relationship
between school spending and student outcomes, the
question of whether additional dollars spent on schools
will improve outcomes remains unresolved—and hotly
contested. Indeed, in papers prepared for a special issue of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Economic Policy
Review devoted to education in America, Eric Hanushek
and Alan Krueger evaluate the existing evidence in differ-
ent ways. Hanushek (1998) concludes that “the current
organization and incentives of schools do little to ensure
that any added resources will be used effectively” (p. 23).
Krueger (1998), however, asserts that “the U.S. public
school system has not deteriorated and may in fact be rea-
sonably efficacious” (p. 38). While these authors certainly
disagree about the degree to which American schools are
“broken,” and about how to read the existing evidence on
school spending and student outcomes, it is reasonably
certain that neither believes there to be a mechanical pro-
duction relationship between dollars and achievement, as
might be implied by the unfortunately popular name of
the “education production function” literature.
The realization that it was fruitless to utilize an
education production approach to quantify the impact of
finance reforms led several researchers to explore directly
the performance effects of school finance reforms. The first
paper in this line of research is Downes (1992), in which
the extensive school finance reforms in California in the
late 1970s were analyzed. This work indicated that greater
equality across school districts in per-pupil spending
was not accompanied by greater equality in measured
student performance. In part, this failure of performance to
converge was attributable to growing cost differentials
between high-performance and low-performance districts.
Nevertheless, the paper raised troubling questions about
the efficacy of finance reforms of the type implemented in
California. Because this research focused on the possibly
unique California case, however, the generalizability of the
conclusions is debatable.
Hoxby (1998) uses national-level data to charac-
terize how finance reforms change the incentives facing
local districts and, thus, per-pupil spending. She also con-
siders how these changes affect dropout rates. She finds
that, on average, dropout rates increase about 8 percent in
states that adopt state-level financing of the public schools.
And, while Hoxby’s work does not explicitly address the
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student performance, it seems likely that much of the
growth in dropout rates occurred in those districts with
relatively high dropout rates prior to equalization. In
other words, these results imply that equalization could
adversely affect both the level and the distribution of
student performance. 
Although Hoxby raises an important point, her
approach misses key features of school finance reforms that
are relevant for exploring the effects on student outcomes.
Because she does not explicitly account for the imposition
of tax or expenditure limits, which we demonstrate in
Downes and Figlio (1998) to be important determinants of
student outcomes, and because the passage of these limits
is often roughly contemporaneous with school finance
reforms, it is unclear whether the changes in performance
observed by Hoxby are attributable to school finance
reforms or to the imposition of tax or expenditure limits.
Furthermore, Hoxby’s method focuses on local incentives
and does not explicitly account for changes in direct state
support of public schools. Large changes in the fiscal
incentives provided to school districts have generally been
associated with large changes in the ways in which school
spending is allocated at the state level (Brunner and
Sonstelie 1999).
While the dropout rate is an outcome measure
of considerable interest, analyses of the quality of public
education in the United States tend to focus on standardized
test scores and other measures of student performance
that provide some indication of how the general student
population is faring. Recent work of Husted and Kenny
(1996) suggests that equalization may detrimentally affect
student achievement. Using data on thirty-seven states from
1987-88 to 1992-93, they find that the mean Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT) score is higher for those states with
greater intrastate spending variation. Like Hoxby, however,
Husted and Kenny fail to control for the imposition of tax
or expenditure limits, and, because they use state-level
data, Husted and Kenny cannot examine the intrastate
impact of equalization. Finally, since only a select set of
students take the SAT, Husted and Kenny are not able to
consider how equalization affects the performance of all
students in a state.
Card and Payne (1998) also use SAT scores to
explore the relationship between school finance reforms
and student achievement. The authors tend to find that
school finance equalization improves outcomes for lower
income students, indicating that it may have some positive
redistributive consequences. While Card and Payne adjust
SAT scores to a larger degree than Husted and Kenny to
account for selectivity, many of the concerns associated
with Husted and Kenny’s paper are relevant for their work
as well.
To date, the only paper to investigate the effects of
school finance reforms on the full distribution of students
is Downes and Figlio (1998). In this paper, as well as in our
other work, we use variants of an event analysis approach to
quantify the impact of finance reforms and tax limits. Since
tax limits and finance reforms differ (sometimes dramati-
cally) from state to state, such an approach is imperfect for
isolating the effects of these policies. Although we recog-
nize this limitation of the event analysis approach, we also
feel that compromises must be made if we are to attain a
national perspective on the impact of these policies. Thus,
to partly account for the heterogeneity of school finance
reforms, we categorize the reforms according to whether
they are or are not court-mandated, as suggested by
Downes and Shah (1995).
We recognize that our classification of school
finance reforms as court-mandated or legislatively
mandated is somewhat crude, since there exists considerable
heterogeneity across school finance reforms. Thus, in Downes
and Figlio (1998), we also adopted Hoxby’s (1998) sug-
gested classification of reforms as “pro-spending” or
“anti-spending.”  8 More work on classifying and identify-
ing school finance reforms, as well as more individual-state
analyses, are certainly in order. 9 
Downes and Figlio (1998) use information from
two rounds of individual-level data on student attributes
and test scores: the National Education Longitudinal Survey
(surveyed students were high school seniors in 1992) and
the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class
of 1972. We linked students to their schools and estimated
separate effects of school finance reforms, as well as tax or
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school finance policies and those in schools “leveled down”
(in relative terms) by the policies. We found that court-
mandated and legislatively mandated school finance reforms
tended to increase average public school performance and
that students in initially low-spending school districts
tended to benefit the most from legislative reforms. We
also found that, if anything, anti-spending reforms led to
increased student outcomes and pro-spending reforms led
to decreased student outcomes.
In more recent work (Downes and Figlio 1999),
we have explored the effects of school finance reforms on
private school performance, using an identical empirical
approach to the one we used to measure public school per-
formance effects. In that paper, we observed that, while our
models yielded a statistically insignificant distributional
test score effect of legislative school finance reforms, we
found a strong, statistically significant distributional effect
of court-mandated school finance reforms. Specifically, we
found that the relationship between school finance reforms
and private school student test scores increased with the
ratio of the initial county expenditures relative to the
average per-pupil expenditures in the state. Taken together
with our finding in earlier work of no impact of court-
mandated reforms on the distribution of public school
test scores or even on the level of public school test scores
in states other than California, this finding could indicate
that court-mandated finance reforms are widening slightly
the dispersion in overall (that is, public and private) student
performance. In such a case, the school finance policies
intended to decrease the dispersion of student outcomes
may actually tend to increase this dispersion.
SCHOOL FINANCE REFORMS AND 
COMMUNITY COMPOSITION
The preceding discussion provides a strong motivation for
why it is so important to consider the school choice impli-
cations of school finance reforms. Students are not tied to a
particular school or even to a particular neighborhood or
community. This point, which has become a central theme
of much of the theoretical work mentioned above, indicates
the possibility that the distributional effects, if any, of
redistribution of resources per se in the public sector could
be undone by geographic resorting and public-private
selection of students, particularly if peer effects and teacher
quality (both of which, alas, are difficult to measure) matter
more than school spending.
To date, the empirical literature has been extremely
quiet with regard to the possible school choice responses to
school finance reforms. Only one study, Aaronson (1999),
directly addresses the impact these policies have on the
degree of homogeneity of affected districts. Aaronson finds
that the extent of income sorting is unaffected by a state
supreme court decision ruling the existing system of school
financing unconstitutional. Only in states in which the
system of school financing has been upheld by the courts
does Aaronson detect any evidence of changes in the com-
position of affected districts. His results indicate that, in
the aftermath of a supreme court decision for the state, the
fraction of low-income individuals increases in districts in
the bottom portion of the state’s across district income
distribution. Also, the only significant compositional effect
Aaronson uncovers when examining the fraction of high-
income individuals who live in high-income districts is a
decline in the fraction of high-income individuals in those
districts that have both high average incomes and low
median house values.
Aaronson’s work is ground-breaking, careful, and
thoughtful, but it also has flaws that could affect the con-
clusions. First, for 1970, Aaronson is unable to create
school-district-level measures for nonurban districts. Thus,
most of his empirical work is based on 1980 to 1990
changes. The concern, therefore, is that the base year is
too close to the policy implementation. While Aaronson’s
conclusions are the same if he examines 1970 to 1990
changes for those districts for which he has data and if he
omits those states with policy changes close to 1980, the
possibility still exists that the preferred estimates of the
policy effects understate their actual effect.
The second flaw in Aaronson’s approach is that he
groups districts on the basis of their location in the state’s
income distribution, not on the basis of their location in
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Aaronson asks if, in low-income districts, the fraction of
families with low incomes changes in the aftermath of a
court-mandated finance reform. The problem with this
approach is that these policies differentially affect districts
on the basis of their education spending, not on the basis of
their personal income. There are numerous examples of
districts with low per-capita incomes and high levels of
education spending. In short, the policy variables should
be interacted with initial levels of per-pupil spending and
not with initial income levels.
The final drawback to Aaronson’s approach is that
he looks only at the impact the policies have on income
sorting. While much of the theoretical literature concen-
trates on income sorting, it is because in most theoretical
models demand for education is perfectly correlated with
income. In reality, demand for education may be as
strongly correlated with parental education levels as with
income. Thus, the need exists to consider the impact of the
policies on the extent of sorting by education.
In recent work (Downes and Figlio 1999), we
evaluate the effects of school finance reforms on community
composition, using the school-district-level data described
above. In that paper, we find evidence of policy-induced
resorting, reflected in changes in the observed composition
of school districts. This pattern is consistent qualitatively,
if not always statistically significant, across measures of
community composition for both legislative and court-
mandated reforms, suggesting that a classic Tiebout
story best describes the post-finance reform dynamic.
Specifically, in a Tiebout-world, finance reforms reduce the
incentive to sort on the basis of tastes for education. Thus,
in initially low-spending districts, such policies should
result in relative increases in per-capita income, in relative
declines in the poverty rate, and in relative increases in the
fraction of college-educated people. This is exactly the
pattern of changes that we observe. 
The results that support these conclusions are
shown in Table 1. The differential effect of the policies on
districts with different prereform levels of spending is
revealed by the estimated coefficients on the interactions of
the policy dummy with the ratio of the 1972 level of
per-pupil spending in the district to the state average.10
The fact that the policies differentially affect districts is
supported by these results; per-capita income has grown
less rapidly in high-spending districts in states in which a
legislative reform of the school financing system has been
implemented. This result is paralleled by a finding that the
fraction of individuals with a college degree has declined
relatively in initially high-spending districts in legislative
reform states. For court-ordered reforms, the only apparent
compositional impact is a relative decline in the fraction of
individuals with a college degree.
These estimated compositional effects are rela-
tively easy to reconcile with the estimated impacts of these
policies on the standardized test performance of public
school students as described in Downes and Figlio (1998),
as the reduction in dispersion could be attributable to
relative changes in peer group quality resulting from the
apparent resorting associated with legislative school
finance reforms. Only by determining if the new residents
of low-spending districts choose the public schools, how-
ever, can we check the validity of this argument. 
Table 1
DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES RESULTS
Estimated Effect of School Finance Policies on School District Demographics
Dependent Variable: Change ina
Policy Variable:
Interaction of District 










Fraction with a 
College Degree
Court-mandated reform -0.0428 0.7765 1.1443 -2.5436
(0.0449) (1.1651) (1.0933) (1.1204)
Legislative reform -0.0894 1.2212 0.9675 -2.5435
(0.0395) (1.2030) (0.6713) (1.1362)
R2 0.5538 0.3513 0.4820 0.5832
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Notes:  The regressions also include the 1970 value of the log of per-capita 
income, the fraction below poverty, the fraction with less than a high school 
diploma, the fraction with a college degree, the fraction that are Hispanic, and 
the fraction that are African-American. Also included are controls for the 1972 
fiscal status of the district, as well as a constant, state-specific effects, and 
urbanicity dummy variables reflecting seven urban status possibilities (large 
central city, midsized central city, suburb of large central city, suburb of 
midsized central city, large town, small town, and rural, as defined by the U.S. 
Census Bureau). In addition, the regressions control for tax limit status. Standard 
errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-state correlation of the 
error terms appear in parentheses below the parameter estimates. 
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SCHOOL FINANCE REFORMS AND 
SCHOOL SECTOR SELECTION
The results mentioned above describe the changes in the
composition of different types of communities following
large-scale school finance reforms. But they provide very
little evidence regarding the changes in the composition of
public schools in the wake of finance reforms. Changes in
public school composition could look much different from
changes in school district community composition as a
whole since communities include childless families, families
with children not of school age, and residents who send
their children to private schools. We therefore now explore
the effects of school finance reforms on the characteristics
of student selection into public and private schools.
To this end, we use data from the 1970 and 1990
Public Use Microsamples (PUMS) of the U.S. Census of
Population to explore the school choices of residents of
central cities of metropolitan areas. We focus on two family
characteristics: the household’s income and the education
level of the household head. For the purposes of this
analysis, we consider a household to be high-income if its
income exceeds four times the poverty rate, and we con-
sider a household to be highly educated if the household
head has a four-year college degree. We estimate the effect
of school finance reforms on public school enrollment rates
of different types of people using a “difference-in-difference”
strategy: we compute a policy effect by calculating the
estimated difference between cities subject to a school
finance reform and those not subject to a reform in the
change within a city from 1970 to 1990 in the fraction
of the public school student population that comes from
a highly educated or high-income household. In this
approach, we also control for changes in tax limit status. 
We present in Table 2 the estimated policy effects
of court-mandated and legislative school finance reforms.
We observe that court-mandated school finance reforms are
associated with differential increases in public sector
rates of household education and income that are statisti-
cally distinct from zero. Legislative school finance reforms
also apparently differentially increase public sector rates of
household education and income, although these differ-
ences are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Therefore, the evidence suggests that school finance
reforms are associated with increases in the rates of highly
educated and high-income households sending their
children to urban public schools.
Even this comparison, however, does not provide
complete evidence on the sorting story. To fill in the rest of
the picture, we also perform the same comparisons using
data from the private sector. The second row of Table 2
presents the same type of difference-in-difference analysis
in which we are interested for the set of students who
reside in the central city of a metropolitan area and attend
private school. We observe that court-ordered school
finance reforms are associated with significant increases
in the fraction of high-income and highly educated fam-
ilies among central-city residents who are private school
attendees. Moreover, this difference is qualitatively larger
for the private sector than for the public sector and is
statistically distinct from the public sector (at the 8 percent
level) in the case of highly educated families. In the case of
legislative school finance reforms, a similar pattern emerges,
but is only significantly different between public and
private sectors with regard to the education characteristic.
Table 2
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE RESULTS
Estimated Effects of Tax Limits and School Finance Reforms 
on Public and Private School Composition
Composition Variable














Public school students  0.071  0.036  0.043  0.010
(0.029) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019)
Private school students  0.124  0.037  0.141  0.054
(0.041) (0.034) (0.039) (0.036)
p-value of difference 0.151 0.970 0.082 0.063
Source:  Authors’ calculations.
Notes:  The results in the table are based on the set of students in the 1 percent 
sample of the decennial census residing in central cities of metropolitan areas. 
The reported figures are the estimated difference between policy cities and 
no-policy cities (for each of the various policies) in the difference between 1990 
and 1970 composition measures. The regressions also control for tax limit status. 
Standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and within-city error 
correlation appear in parentheses below the parameter estimates.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999 107
In summary, the evidence is wholly consistent
with the notion of highly educated families and, to a lesser
extent, high-income families moving to the central cities
in response to school finance reforms and sending their
children to private schools. Therefore, the community
composition results described above are, as we suspected,
almost surely not reflective of changes in the student body
population. The results are also consistent with the perfor-
mance findings that suggest that both public school student
and private school student test scores increase in communi-
ties that are “leveled up” by school finance reforms. These
results suggest that the performance findings may be either
directly or indirectly reflective of the compositional
changes that we are noticing herein.
In related work (Downes and Figlio 1999), we
look at public and private school composition for a broader
set of communities—not just central-city students—using
data from the National Education Longitudinal Survey and
the National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class
of 1972 and find similar distinctions between selection
into public and private schools. In that paper, we report
that court-mandated school finance reforms are associated
negatively with the income level and parental education
level of public school students, but the interaction with
initial per-pupil expenditure is significantly positive,
suggesting that the negative compositional effect of court-
mandated reforms is primarily a property of relatively
low-spending schools.11 Selection into private schools as a
function of prereform county per-pupil expenditures is
qualitatively a mirror image of selection into public
schools as a function of prereform per-pupil expenditures.
For instance, we observe that court-mandated reforms tend
to lead to positive income selection into private schools,
but this selection is attenuated as the relative spending
level of the county increases. The results are the same,
qualitatively, in the case of parental education—there
appears to be positive selection into the private sector in
the wake of school finance reforms, but less so (if any) as
initial levels of relative public school spending increase.
With regard to both parental education and family income,
differential selection into public schools at different levels
of 1972 county relative per-pupil spending is statistically
distinct from the estimated differential selection in the
private sector. The estimated effects of legislative school
finance reforms, however, seem to follow no perceptible
pattern and are not statistically significant.
A likely, though not exclusive, explanation for
these findings and those summarized in Table 2 is that
some high-income and highly educated parents respond to
school finance equalizations by moving to relatively poor
school districts and selecting into private schools. Such an
outcome, forecast by authors such as Nechyba (1996), is
consistent with stronger positive selection into public
schools from initially high-spending counties and stronger
positive selection into private schools from initially low-
spending counties. 
CONCLUSION
Hopefully, what this brief review of the literature makes
clear is that the impact of school finance reforms on the
extent of income inequality in the United States remains
to be determined. Nevertheless, one lesson should be clear
from this discussion: if the goal is to reduce income
inequality substantially, state supreme court decisions
mandating relatively specific changes in the school finance
system are not particularly effective policy instruments.
Even the most optimistic estimates of the impact of court-
mandated school finance reforms on the distribution of
student performance indicate that these distributional
effects are relatively small. And these small gains come at
the potential cost of movement of higher income families
into the private sector and a concomitant increase in the
extent of sorting by income in the schools. The goal of
reducing the persistence of income inequality is laudable.
However, court mandates that dictate the nature of school
finance reforms do not seem to be particularly good tools
for accomplishing this goal.108 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / SEPTEMBER 1999 NOTES
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1. For example, the simple correlation between the log of current
spending per pupil and the log of per-capita income was 0.344 in 1970
and 0.304 in 1990. Similarly, in a regression of the log of per-capita
income on the log of current spending per pupil and state-specific effects,
the coefficient on the log of current spending per pupil was 0.164 in
1970 and 0.136 in 1990.
2. The simple correlation, for example, between the log of current
spending per pupil and the poverty rate was -0.345 in 1970 and -0.155
in 1990; the regression coefficient on the log of current spending per
pupil was -1.082 in 1970 and 2.023 in 1990.
3.  For instance, the simple correlation between the log of current
spending per pupil and the log of per-capita income was 0.342 in 1970
and 0.447 in 1990; the regression coefficient on the log of current
spending per pupil was 0.167 in 1970 and 0.399 in 1990.
4.  The simple correlation, for instance, between the log of current
spending per pupil and the poverty rate was -0.343 in 1970 and -0.296
in 1990; the regression coefficient on the log of current spending per
pupil was -1.103 in 1970 and 0.048 in 1990.
5.  Theory is also equivocal about the impact of school finance reforms
on mean income in a state. For example, Bénabou’s (1996) results imply
that mean income could decline, while Fernández and Rogerson (1997,
1998) generally find that moving to a state system of financing could
increase mean income.
6. The existence of peer effects need not accentuate the tendency to sort.
See de Bartolome (1990) and Brueckner and Lee (1989) for models in
which peer effects exist and heterogeneous communities form. What is
clear from these models is that the degree of sorting will depend critically
on the benefits that high-income or high-ability individuals get from
mixing with lower income or lower ability individuals.
7. This paper is not the place to discuss the relative advantages and
disadvantages of the approaches taken in these two papers. We refer the
reader to the individual papers for the relevant discussions.
8. The pro-spending/anti-spending classification is based upon the
impact a reform has on the cost to local taxpayers of increasing spending
by one dollar, holding constant intergovernmental aid. A pro-spending
reform reduces this cost; an anti-spending reform increases it.
9. Aaronson (1999) has suggested a third alternative characterization of
finance reforms based on the outcome of court challenges to a state’s
school finance system. 
10. The specifications that generate the estimates in Table 1 include a
full set of state dummies. As a result, it is not possible to estimate
separately the common impact of any one of the policies on all districts
in the state that have implemented that policy. This limitation prevents
us, for example, from determining if the outcomes are consistent with
Fernández and Rogerson’s (1997, 1998) prediction of increasing per-
capita income after a shift to state financing.
11. We find similar results, although less statistically significant, in the
case of legislative school finance reforms.REFERENCES
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